摘要
运用复杂网络方法,基于中国金融机构间持股信息构建其股权联结网络,发现金融机构间股权联结随时间明显递增,网络由稀疏演化为高度密集状态;在此基础上系统考察股权联结关系如何影响金融业市场稳定,结果稳健地显示,金融机构越是位于股权联结网络中心,其股价崩盘风险越低,股权联结网络具有崩盘抑制效应。机制检验表明,股权联结网络可以帮助金融机构加强对管理层监督、抑制大股东掏空和发挥信息流通效应来提升治理水平与信息水平,进而降低崩盘风险。进一步分析发现,股权联结网络更有助于国有金融机构降低崩盘风险,且股权联结网络存在“溢出效应”,能够显著降低其关联机构的整体崩盘风险。股灾时“国家队”的加入大幅加强了金融机构间股权联结关系,且使股权联结网络对股价崩盘风险和社团崩盘风险的抑制作用增强,表明政府的介入是有效的。
Complexities in the prevention and control of financial risks resulting from continuously strengthened links between financial institutions have become the focus of attention for all sectors of society.Using the complex network method to construct a network of equity linkages between Chinese financial institutions based on their shareholding information,this study found that equity linkages between financial institutions evolved from being sparse to highly dense over time.Based on these findings,the closer a financial institution is to the core area of the equity linkage network,the lower its stock price crash risk,thus highlighting that the equity linkage network has an inhibitory effect on stock price crash.The mechanism test suggested that financial institutions could reduce stock price crash risk by enhancing management oversight,inhibiting tunneling by major shareholders,and improving information efficiency through the equity linkage network.The heterogeneity analysis showed that the equity linkage network could help state-owned financial institutions better reduce stock price crash risk and had a“spillover effect,”which could significantly reduce the overall stock price crash risk of their affiliated institutions.The participation of a“national team”during a stock market crash in 2015 can strengthen equity linkages between financial institutions and enhance the inhibitory effect of the equity linkage network on stock price crash risk and association collapse risk.This study recommends that regulators should strengthen the risk supervision of relatively isolated financial institutions and non-state-owned financial institutions and moderately increase the state’s shareholdings in financial institutions so that the competent government can better play the role of a stabilizer to maintain the stability of the financial system.
作者
强皓凡
章君瑶
陈祺昌
肖康康
Qiang Haofan;Zhang Junyao;Chen Qichang;Xiao Kangkang(School of Economics,Fudan University,Shanghai 200433,China;School of Accountancy,Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanchang 330013,Jiangxi,China;China Construction Fifth Engineering Division Corporation,Hefei 230051,Anhui,China;Party School of the Hunan Provincial Committee of CPC,Changsha 410006,Hunan,China)
出处
《金融经济学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第4期32-49,共18页
Financial Economics Research
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71873039、71573051)。
关键词
股权联结
复杂网络
金融业市场稳定
股价崩盘风险
“国家队”
equity linkage
complex network
financial market stability
stock price crash risk
“national team”