董事高管责任保险与债券信用利差——基于风险冲击视角

Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance and Bond Credit Spread:An Empirical Study Based on A-share Listed Companies

利用2008—2019年中国沪深A股上市公司的债券发行数据,基于债券投资者视角,研究上市公司购买董责险对债券信用利差的影响,以检验债券投资者对董责险的理解与态度,实证结果显示,上市公司购买董责险后,其债券信用利差显著降低。进一步分析发现,在董事会独立性差、聘用“非四大”会计师事务所、机构投资者比例低、位于市场化和法制化水平较低地区的公司,董责险对债券信用利差的降低作用更显著。这表明,债券投资者认为董责险通过发挥外部监督作用提升了公司治理水平,因此对购买了董责险的公司发行的债券要求更低的收益率。基于此,可鼓励企业引入董责险,降低融资成本,提升企业治理水平。

To test the bond investors’understanding and attitude towards directors and officers(D&O)liability insurance,this study investigated the effect of the purchase of D&O liability insurance on bond credit spread among listed firms from a bond investor’s perspective.The bond issuance data of A-share listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2019 was used.The empirical results showed that bond credit spread among listed firms reduced significantly after they purchased D&O liability insurance.Furthermore,the analysis revealed that the role of D&O liability insurance in reducing bond credit spread was more significant among firms with poor board independence,firms employing“non-big four”accounting firms,firms with a low proportion of institutional investors,and firms located in regions with low levels of marketization and legalization.As suggested by these findings,bond investors opine that D&O liability insurance improves corporate governance by playing an external oversight role and,thus,demand lower yields on bonds issued by firms that have purchased D&O liability insurance.Hence,firms can be encouraged to introduce D&O liability insurance to reduce financing costs and improve corporate governance.