对康德判断理论的阐释与辩护——兼论康德先天综合判断的理论系统

The Interpretation and Defence of Kant’s Theory of Judgments——On Kant’s System of Theory of Synthetical Judgments a Priori

康德通过主谓词之间的包含关系来区分分析判断和综合判断,并将先天与必然,后天与偶然严格地一一对应起来。康德在对先天与后天,分析与综合进行排列组合之后,提出了先天综合判断,并且认为存在着三种知识门类的先天综合判断(命题),即数学的,自然科学的以及形而上学的先天综合判断,以此构建了其整个理论系统。一些分析哲学家直接反驳康德的判断理论。蒯因认为在分析判断与综合判断之间根本不存在着严格的区分,克里普克则认为先天的不一定是必然的,后天的也不一定是偶然的。通过相关的阐释,笔者回应这些质疑与反驳,对康德的判断理论进行辩护。区分分析判断与综合判断的标准正是在于判断中主词与谓词的关系,亦即主词是否包含了谓词。并且,一切分析判断必定都是必然的、先天的,没有后天分析判断;而来自于经验的综合判断则是后天的,也必定是偶然的。

Kant discriminates analytical judgments from synthetical judgments through the including relation of subjects and predicates, and correspondents a priori with necessity, a posteri with occasionality strictly. After arranging “a priori” and “a posteri”, “analytical” and “synthetical”, Kant puts forward synthetical judgments a priori, thinks that all propositions of pure mathematic, pure natural science and scientific metaphysics have the form of synthetical judgments a priori, and through these judgments constructs his system of theory. Some scholars question Kant’s expression of the including relation of subjects and predicates. And some analytical philosophers directly object to Kant’s Theory of Judgments. Quine thinks that there is not a strict discrimination for analytical judgments and synthetical judgments. Kripke thinks that judgments a priori are not always necessary, and judgments a posteri are not always occasional. Through relevant interpretations, we respond to these questions and objections to defend Kant’s Theory of Judgments. Through the including relation of subjects and predicates, we can discriminate analytical judgments from synthetical judgments. All analytical judgments are a priori, and must be necessary. While synthetical judgments from experience are posteri, and must be occasional.