基于三方博弈模型的企业环保策略监管研究

Research on enterprise environmental protection strategy supervision based on a tripartite game model

为解决企业违规排污问题、节约政府资源、遏制生产企业与媒体之间的寻租行为,文章基于政府、生产企业和媒体的三方利益关系建立了演化博弈模型,并进行算例仿真,研究影响三方稳定演化策略的因素。在已有稳定演化策略的基础上,得到最符合实际要求的稳定演化策略及二次演化路径。研究表明存在3种稳定演化策略:政府对企业、媒体的奖惩力度和企业的生产收入会对媒体拒绝寻租、企业遵守环保标准生产的概率产生正向影响;媒体收获的社会效益也会对环境产生积极影响;政府对企业奖惩的力度会间接影响媒体的行为,当政府对企业违规行为处罚越高,越有可能使得媒体的寻租企图失败。相对应的,政府贯彻施政的概率会减小,成为以上3种稳定演化策略中的较优策略;政府依次加大对媒体的奖惩力度,为媒体带来更高的社会效益,增加对生产企业违规的处罚,可使另外2种稳定演化策略转变为较优的稳定演化策略。上述结果表明,政府制定合理的奖惩机制可有效抑制媒体寻租,促进企业选择环保策略。

In order to solve the illegal discharge problem, save the government resources and curb the rent-seeking behavior between production enterprises and the media, this paper established an evolutionary game model based on the benefit relationship among the government, production enterprises and the media. Moreover, this paper simulated the influencing factors of the tripartite stable evolutionary strategies. The most practical, stable evolutionary strategy and its second evolutionary paths were obtained from the existing strategies. The results showed that there were three stable evolutionary strategies. It had a positively influence on the media to refuse the rent-seeking and on the enterprises to comply with environmental standards by considering the rewards and punishments to enterprises and the media from the government as well as the production income of enterprises. The social benefit from the media also had a positive effect on the environment. The strength of rewards and punishments from the government to enterprises indirectly affected the behavior of the media. When the government punished enterprises for violations, the rent-seeking attempt of the media was more likely to fail. Correspondingly, the probability of the government implementing the policy would be reduced, which became the better one among the three stable evolutionary strategies. The government should increase the rewards and punishments to the media, bring the media with higher social benefits and increase the penalties for violations of production enterprises by turn, thus making the other two stable evolutionary strategies become better stable evolutionary strategies. The above results showed that the government’s reasonable reward and punishment mechanism could effectively inhibit the media rent-seeking and promote enterprises to choose better environmental protection strategies.