审计委员会主任地理距离与公司风险承担

Audit Committee Chair s Geographic Distance and Corporate Risk-taking

本文以2007—2018年我国A股上市公司为样本,研究了审计委员会主任地理距离对公司风险承担的影响。研究发现,审计委员会主任地理距离越远,公司风险承担水平越高。进一步分析发现,机构投资者持股、事务所规模以及分析师关注度能够缓解审计委员会主任地理距离对公司风险承担的正向影响作用。机制检验结果显示,内部控制质量和盈余质量在审计委员会主任地理距离与公司风险承担的关系中起到部分中介作用。本文的研究结论对公司选聘审计委员会主任的决策提供了新的经验证据,对于提高审计委员会履职水平、保护投资者利益具有重要的启示意义。

Using a sample of A-share listed companies in China from 2007 to 2018,this paper empirically examines the relationship between geographic distance of the audit committee chair(ACC)and corporate risk-taking.The result shows that,the farther the ACC is from the company,the higher risk-taking level of the company.Meanwhile,the diligence and reputation of the ACC can mitigate this effect.Further analyses show that,the extent to which geographic distance plays a role in the level of corporate risk-taking is also influenced by the shareholding of institutional investors,the size of audit firms and analysts attention.Moreover,both the internal control quality and earning quality play a part of mediating role in the relationship between ACC geographic distance and corporate risk-taking.The findings provide new empirical evidence for companies to select ACCs and have important implications for improving the performance level of audit committee and protecting the interests of investors.