摘要
皮尔士有关目的论解释的理论将终极因视为一种对结果的一般特征的约束或规范。终极因的规范性解释效力与效力因的机械解释效力并不冲突,前者具有后者没有的整合能力。如此理解的规范性终极因并不局限于生命现象,而是作为一种一般的因果结构,可被运用于任何可能包含倾向性的现象。借助皮尔士的因果理论和符号学结构,可以给出一个关于终极因如何起作用的结构性说明;通过分析将该结构运用于三类不同的实例(意向行为、生物现象和物理现象),可为理解一般的目的论解释提供一种说明。
Peirce’s theory of causation considers the final cause as constraints or norms of the general character of the result. The final cause has the normative explanatory power which does not conflict with the mechanical explanatory power of the efficient cause;the former has an integrating power that the latter does not have. The normative final cause so understood is not limited to life phenomena, but as a general causal structure that can be applied to any phenomenon that may contain tendencies. With the help of Peirce’s semiotic structure, a structural account of how the final cause works can be given;by analyzing the application of the structure to three different types of instances(intentional acts, biological phenomena, and physical phenomena), an account can be provided for understanding teleological explanation in general.
作者
程都
CHENG Du(School of Philosophy,Zhejiang University,Hangzhou 310058,China)
出处
《自然辩证法研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第11期23-29,共7页
Studies in Dialectics of Nature
关键词
目的论解释
终极因
皮尔士
符号学结构
teleological explanation
final cause
Peirce
semiotic structure