实质主义对倾向论的批判论析

On the Criticism of Dispositionalism by Quidditism

承袭分析形而上学关于性质的研究,倾向论将性质理解为不可还原的倾向,用法则作用解释倾向的识别。实质主义对倾向论的批判可见于两个方面,一是倾向论无法赋予性质坚实的本体论基础,并面临认知倒退的困境;二是性质不具有内在的因果效力,倾向论忽视了“例示”在理解性质中的关键地位。实质主义对倾向论的批判有混淆认识论问题与形而上学问题之嫌,它坚持性质有其“实质”,并用范畴性质代替倾向性质,但是其理论建构存在“乞题”的错误,难以替代倾向论。深入关于性质的形而上学研究,需要厘清倾向论与实质主义之分歧,进一步对性质的本体论基础作出解读。

Dispositionalism follows the study of property by analytical metaphysics,understands property as irreducible disposition,and uses the nomological roles to explain the identification of disposition.Quidditism criticizes Dispositionalism from two aspects,one is that Dispositionalism cannot give property a solid ontological foundation and faces the dilemma of cognitive regression;the other is that property does not have intrinsic causal power,and Dispositionalism ignores the key position of“instantiation”in understanding property.The criticism of Dispositionalism by Quidditism is suspected of confusing the epistemological problem with the metaphysical problem,Quidditism insists that the property has its“quiddity”,and replaces the dispositional property with the categorical property,but its theoretical construction has the error of“question-begging”,so it is difficult to replace Dispositionalism.In-depth metaphysical research on property requires clarifying the differences between Dispositionalism and Quidditism,and further interpreting the ontological basis of property.