管理层持股对企业过度金融化的影响:促进还是抑制?

The Impact of Managerial Ownership on Corporate Over-Financialization:Promotion or Inhibition?

非金融企业产业空心化、金融热已成为我国当前经济发展中凸出的结构性矛盾。以2007-2021年我国A股上市公司非金融公司数据为样本,以企业过度投资金融产品为出发点探究管理层持股可能对其产生的影响。结果表明:管理层持股比例的增加显著抑制企业过度金融化。具体而言,管理层持股比例增加会增强管理层主人翁意识,降低企业杠杆率,优化投资效率,进而抑制企业过度金融化。差异性分析表明:管理层持股比例增加对企业过度金融化的抑制作用在企业分析师关注水平较低、公司治理机制不完善、投资机会较少的企业中尤为明显。因此,应差异化对待企业金融化行为,完善企业外部监管体系,引导实体企业回归主营业务,促进实体经济的发展与转型。

The hollowing out of the non-financial sectors and increase in financial activities of these firms have become an issue of serious concern for China’s economic growth. Taking data of non-financial firms from 2007-2021, the present study measures the optimal financialization level of the firms and empirically investigates the role of managerial ownership in excessive financialization of the non-financial sector enterprises. An increase in the proportion of managerial ownership significantly decreases the over-financialization of enterprises. The results also shows that an increase in the proportion of management shares enhances the sense of ownership, reducing the enterprise’s leverage ratio, optimizing the investment efficiency, and reducing the firm’s excessive financialization. The inhibitory effect of the increase in the proportion of managerial ownership on the over-financialization of enterprises is particularly prominent in enterprises with weak external supervision, a low level of internal governance, and fewer investment opportunities. Therfore, corporate financialization should be treated differently to strengthen the external supervision of the enterprises and guide the enterprises to their primary business model so that they can contribute to real economic development and transformation.