管理者能力、企业信息透明度与企业风险承担

Management Capability,Enterprise Information Transparency and Enterprise Risk Taking

文章以委托代理理论和信号传递理论为基础,利用2010—2019年的经济数据构建面板固定效应模型,实证分析管理者能力对企业风险承担的影响。结果表明:第一,管理者能力能够显著提高企业风险承担水平;第二,信息透明度在管理者能力和企业风险承担水平之间发挥遮掩作用;第三,战略差异度会削弱管理者能力对企业风险承担水平的促进作用;第四,管理者能力的促进作用在非国有企业和两职合一的企业中效果更佳。综合上述研究结果提出相应政策建议。

Based on principal-agent theory and signal transmission theory, this paper uses economic data from 2010 to 2019 to build a panel fixed effect model and empirically analyzes the impact of managers’ ability on enterprise risk taking. The results show that: first, managers’ ability can significantly improve the level of enterprise risk taking;Secondly, information transparency plays a hiding role between managers’ ability and enterprises’ risk-taking level. Thirdly, the degree of strategic difference will weaken the promotion effect of managers’ ability on the level of enterprise risk taking;Fourth, the promotion effect of managers’ ability is better in non-state-owned enterprises and two-job integration enterprises. Finally, the paper puts forward corresponding policy suggestions based on the above research results.