经济增长目标赶超与企业创新质量

Economic Growth Target Catching up and Corporate Innovation Quality

研究了经济增长目标设定上的赶超行为对辖区内企业创新质量的影响。结果发现:地方官员为了在以地区生产总值为核心的官员考核机制中胜出,会以上级政府及同一省内的其他城市设定的经济增长目标为参照系进行赶超,并以强约束的形式设定更高的经济增长目标。这一经济增长目标设定上的赶超行为通过创新激励扭曲、财政支出失衡与金融资源错配三种路径抑制了辖区内企业的创新质量。而2013年破除“唯GDP论”的官员考核机制变革促进地方经济增长目标设定的合理回归,带来了辖区内企业更多、更绿色、更高质量的专利产出。

This paper examines the impact of catch-up behaviors in economic growth target setting on the innovation quality of enterprises in the jurisdiction.Results show that,in order to win in the official evaluation mechanism with regional GDP as the core indicator,local officials always set higher economic growth target than other cities in the same province with strong constraints.These behaviors reduce innovation incentives,curb public service expenditure on science and technology and cause the misallocation of financial resources.These distortions result in the low level of quality of corporate innovation in the area.However,the reform of the official evaluation system began in 2013 promote the rationality of local governments in setting growth targets and bring more,greener and higher quality corporate patent outputs.