威廉姆森的模态认识论:一种温和的模态怀疑论

Williamson’s Modal Epistemology:Moderate Modal Skepticism

模态认识论是当今分析哲学的前沿且热点话题之一,主要探讨“我们能不能获得那些可能性或必然性的知识”这个问题。哲学的论证中充斥着大量的模态前提,而证成这些前提则是我们评估论证好坏的重要一环。威廉姆森借助于NEC和POS这两类逻辑等价关系,认为我们日常处理反事实条件句的认知能力给我们带来了获得形而上学模态性知识的认知能力。学界对威廉姆森的理论提出了构成性事实以及模态性厘定的质疑,但实际上这些质疑并不成功。对形而上学模态进行分层处理之后,我们发现对于“清晰事例”的形而上学模态知识,可以借助于逻辑与物理等方式去获得;对于“不清晰事例”的形而上学模态知识则持一种怀疑论的态度,但这并不妨碍我们具有形而上学模态知识的认知能力。

Modal epistemology is one of the hot topics in analytical philosophy.It mainly discusses whether we can obtain the knowledge of possibility or necessity.Philosophical arguments consist of abundant modal premises,and to justify these premises is an important step for us to assess whether it is a good argument or not.With the help of two kinds of logic equivalence:NEC and POS,Williamson’s counterfactual theory holds that the ordinary cognitive capacity to handle counterfactual conditionals carries with it the cognitive capacity to handle metaphysical modality.Some academics have expressed their doubts about constitutive facts and determination of modality in Williamson’s theory.The doubts are analyzed in this text and we find they arc not successful.And also after hierarchically processing metaphysical modality,we can obtain metaphysical modal knowledge of clear cases via logical and physical approaches.However,we hold the skeptical attitude towards metaphysical modal knowledge of unclear cases,but this does not prevent us from having the cognitive capacity of metaphysical modal knowledge.