盈余管理、信贷配置与银行风险承担

Earnings Management, Credit Allocation and Bank Risk-Taking

本文以2010—2020年商业银行为研究样本,构建面板回归模型,实证检验盈余管理对银行风险承担的影响及其作用机制。研究表明:(1)盈余管理对银行风险承担具有促进作用。相对于国有银行、股份制银行,盈余管理对城农商行风险承担的影响力度更大;相对于上市银行,盈余管理对非上市银行风险承担的影响力度更大。(2)信贷配置在盈余管理与银行风险承担的关系中承担着中介作用,盈余管理通过提高银行信贷配置规模促进银行风险承担,“盈余管理-信贷配置-银行风险承担”的传导渠道有效。(3)审计师变更对盈余管理与银行风险承担关系具有负向调节作用,即审计师变更会减弱盈余管理对银行风险承担的促进作用。(4)银行监管对盈余管理与银行风险承担关系具有负向调节作用,即银行监管力度的提高会减弱盈余管理对银行风险承担的促进作用。本文结果为规范银行盈余管理行为及防控银行业信贷风险提供了理论指导与决策参考。

This paper selects the annual data of commercial banks in China from 2010 to 2020 as study samples, and constructs a panel regression model to empirically analyze the impact of earnings management on bank risk-taking and its mechanism. The research shows that:(1) Earnings management can promote the risk-taking of banks. Compared with state-owned banks and joint-stock banks, earnings management has a greater impact on the risk-taking of urban and rural commercial banks. Compared with listed banks, earnings management has a greater impact on the risk-taking of non-listed banks.(2) Credit allocation plays an intermediary role in the relationship between earnings management and bank risk-taking. Earnings management mainly promotes bank risk-taking by increasing the scale of bank credit allocation. The transmission channel of “earnings managementcredit allocation-bank risk-taking” is effective.(3) Auditor changes have a negative adjustment effect on the relationship between earnings management and bank risk-taking, namely the auditor changes will weaken the promoting effect of earnings management on bank risk-taking.(4) Bank supervision has a negative adjustment effect on the relationship between earnings management and bank risk-taking, namely the improvement of bank supervision will weaken the promoting effect of earnings management on bank risk-taking. The results of this paper will provide theoretical guidance and decision-making reference for standardizing bank earnings management and preventing and controlling credit risk in the banking industry.