双重信息不对称下PPP项目激励机制研究

Research on the Incentive Mechanism of PPP Project Under Dual Information Asymmetry

针对PPP项目中双重信息不对称带来的道德风险和逆向选择,根据显示原理设计了三阶段契约机制,政府方根据社会资本能力水平提出不同的契约菜单,在激励相容约束下社会资本将如实汇报己方能力水平。构建了关于政府方和社会资本的动态博弈模型,求解得到政府方提供的股权分配比例和运营补贴、社会资本方努力程度的纳什均衡解,以及相关推论和管理学启示:在当前投融资市场激烈的竞争环境下,随着高能力社会资本比例逐步提高,低能力社会资本努力程度恐大幅下降,政府方期望收益也面临较大的风险,所构建的契约机制将发挥优中选优的作用。

In view of moral hazard and adverse selection caused by dual information asymmetry in PPP projects,a three-stage contract mechanism is designed based on the Revelation Principle. In the mechanism, the government side proposes different contract menus according to the social capital capacity endowment,and under the constraint of incentive compatibility,the social capital will truthfully report its own ability endowment. In this paper,a dynamic game model between government and social capital is constructed,and the Nash equilibrium solution of the equity allocation ratio and operating subsidies provided by the government.The degree of effort of the social capital side,and related deductions are solved. Managerial insights are:in the current fierce competitive environment in the investment and financing market,with the gradual increase in the proportion of high-capacity social capital,the degree of effort of low-capacity social capital is likely to decline significantly,and the government’s expected returns are also facing greater risks,and the contract mechanism constructed will play a role in selecting the best of the best.