“双碳”目标下竞争性港口定价博弈

Pricing Game of Competitive Ports with Dual-objective of Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrality

基于伯川德博弈定价博弈模型,在“双碳目标”下分析竞争性港口的定价策略问题,阐释政府低碳政策和客户低碳偏好对港口定价策略的影响,帮助港口有效适应“双碳”政策并且提高拥有低碳偏好的客户黏性和港口竞争力。研究表明:两港共同定价策略高于两港分别定价以及混合定价下的策略,启示港口群内港口之间加强定价合作,实现共赢,而数值仿真则表明,随着港口客户低碳偏好以及政府政策激励的增加,港口的利润均呈上升趋势,启示港口管理者利用政策优势,增加港口低碳建设投入,走高质量发展道路。

Based on the Bertrand game pricing model,this paper analyzes the pricing strategy of competitive ports with both carbon peaking and carbon neutrality goals and explains the influence of government low-carbon policy and customer low-carbon preference on the ports’pricing strategy so as to help them effectively adapt to the requirements of the two goals and improve their retention rate with customers of low-carbon preference and their overall competitiveness.The research shows that the joint pricing strategy of the two ports would yield better than the separate pricing and the mixed pricing strategies,indicating that the ports in a cluster should strengthen pricing cooperation to achieve win-win;and through a numerical simulation,it is found that with the increase of the low-carbon preference of port customers and the intensity of government policy incentives,the profits of both ports would be on the rise,suggesting that port operators should leverage policy advantages to increase the investment in port low-carbon construction and take the road of high-quality development.