基于制度工程学的新能源汽车企业骗补监管制度设计

The Design of the Supervision System for the New Energy Automobile Enterprises to Deceive Compensation Based on Institutional Engineering

近年来,气候变化及绿色发展成为世界关注的焦点,为缓解这一问题,许多国家正大力发展新能源汽车产业,新能源汽车产业在中国也实现了从无到有。由于目前新能源汽车行业尚处于发展初期,面临着诸多难题。政府通过财政补贴、税收优惠等政策手段来鼓励该产业发展,希望来缓解能源危机和减少环境污染。然而,面对政府的巨额补贴,个别企业采用骗补方式来增加企业利润。基于制度工程学构建动态博弈模型,进行企业骗补的惩罚制度设计,并提出相关的对策建议。

In recent years,climate change and green development have become the focus of the world.To alleviate this problem,many countries are vigorously developing the new energy automobile industry,and the new energy automobile industry has also achieved from scratch.As the new energy vehicle industry is still in the early stage of development,it is facing many problems.The government encourages the development of the industry through financial subsidies,tax incentives and other policy means,hoping to alleviate the energy crisis and reduce environmental pollution.However,in the face of huge government subsidies,individual enterprises use frandulent compensation to increase corporate profits.Based on the system engineering.this paper constructs a dynamic game model.designs the punishment system of enterprise compensation fraud and put forward relevant unter measures and suggestion.