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弗雷格的“真”之理论

Gottlob Frege’s Theory of Truth
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摘要 “真”是否是一个可分析的概念?弗雷格给出了否定回答,他认为“真”是自成一格和不可定义的。这种观点虽具有“冗余论”的倾向,弗雷格却认为“真”是居于第三域内的一个十分重要的对象。弗雷格将“思想”认定为真值承担者,但是“真”与思想却不是谓述关系,而是句子的含义和所指之间的关系。真具有独立性、先验性、无程度性、无时间性的特征,在人们思想进行判断和把握时发挥作用,由此可以根据弗雷格对思想结构的分析,总结出一套“弗雷格语义”。从哲学探讨到形式刻画,弗雷格的真理论完整且融贯,弗雷格语义更体现出他的外延论思想,但整个理论也存在着预设过多所带来的问题,并且需要对“断定力”概念作进一步的说明。 Is truth an analyzable concept?Gottlob Frege answered negatively,arguing that truth is sui generis and indefinable.Although this view is redundant,Frege believes that truth is a very important object in the third domain.Frege identified“thought”as the bearer of truth,but truth does not predicate thought,they are the sense and reference(Sinn und Bedeutung)of one sentence.Truth has the characteristics of independence,transcendence,degreelessness,and timelessness,and it plays a role in ones’judgment and grasp of thoughts.From this,a set of Frege semantics can be summed up according to Frege’s analysis of the structure of thoughts.From philosophical discussion to formal characterization,Frege’s theory of truth is complete and coherent,and Frege semantics reflects his denotational theory.Nevertheless,the whole theory has problems caused by too many presuppositions,and the concept of“assertion”needs to be further explained.
作者 李佳明 胡兰双 Li Jiaming;Hu Lanshuang
出处 《南开学报(哲学社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2022年第6期110-122,共13页 Nankai Journal:Philosophy,Literature and Social Science Edition
基金 天津市哲学社会科学规划项目(TJZX21—005)。
关键词 弗雷格 真理论 思想 Frege Theory of Truth Thought
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  • 1Dummett, M. , 1991, Frege and Other Philosophers, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  • 2Frege, G. , 1979, Posthumous Writings , tr. by P. Long and R. White, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
  • 3Frege, G. ,1980, Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence , abridged from the German edition by B. McGuinness, tr. by H. Kaal, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  • 4Frege, G. ,1997 , The Frege Reader , ed. by M. Beaney, Oxford: Blackwell.
  • 5Hanna, R., 2006, Rationality and Logic, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
  • 6Jeshion, R. , 2001, " Frege' s notion of self-evidence", in Mind 110.
  • 7Frege,G,Michael Beaney. Thoughts,in The Frege Reader[M].Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Inc,1918.325-345.
  • 8Frege, G. The Frege Reader[Z].1918.328.
  • 9陈波.超越弗雷格的“第三域”神话[J].哲学研究,2012(2):61-72. 被引量:11

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