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公众参与下排污企业与地方政府环境行为的演化博弈分析 被引量:5

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Environmental Behavior Between Polluters and Local Governments with Public Participation
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摘要 党的二十大报告明确提出持续深入打好蓝天、碧水、净土保卫战,基本消除重污染天气,而有效的大气污染治理需要政府、公众、企业三方力量的结合与互动。在此背景下,本文以空气污染治理为切入点,基于静态和动态两种监管机制,构建了演化博弈模型,系统研究不同公众参与水平下排污企业和地方政府针对空气污染治理的策略演化过程和系统均衡策略,并采用Matlab进行仿真分析。研究结果表明:在静态监管机制下,公众参与是企业和地方政府空气污染治理策略跨越(违法排污,不严格监管)不良状态,达到(合法排污,严格监管)演化均衡的必要条件。在动态监管机制下,当政府环境处罚力度较低时,无论公众参与度高低与否,企业和政府演化均衡策略分别为(违法排污,不严格监管)和(违法排污,严格监管)。当政府处罚力度较高时,随着公众参与度的提升,企业选择合法排污的概率稳定在0.5左右,进一步反映出单一的正式环境规制或非正式环境规制并不能有效遏制企业违法排污行为。因此,从根本上解决空气污染问题,需要强化中央政府的环保督查责任,改革地方政府政绩考核机制、科学引导公众环境参与、增强企业环境责任意识。 Continuously and deeply promote the three strategies of blue sky, blue water and clean soil so as to basically eliminate heavy polluted weatherin the report of the 20th Party Congress was clearly proposed, achieving this goal requires the combination and interaction of government, public and business forces. In this context,in order to systematically studies the strategy evolution process and system equilibrium strategy between emission enterprises and local government for air pollution control under different levels of public participation, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model based on both static and dynamic regulatory mechanisms, which is also verified by using the MATLAB simulation tools. The results show that under the static regulatory mechanism, public participation is necessary for the air pollution management strategies from local environment and companies converting from the undesirable status of(illegal emissions, not strict environmental regulation) to the evolutionary equilibrium of(legal emissions, strict environmental regulation). Under the dynamic regulatory mechanism, no matter whether the public participation is high or low when government environmental penalties are low, the evolve equilibrium strategies of enterprises and the government are(illegal discharge, not strictly regulated) and(illegal discharge, strictly regulated). Respectively;gratifyingly, when government penalties are high, with the increase of public participation, the probability of enterprises choosing legal discharge is stable at 0.5 or so, indicating that a single formal environmental regulation or informal environmental regulation is not effective in curbing enterprises’ illegal emissions. Therefore, only by strengthening the central government’s responsibility for environmental supervision and inspection, reforming local government performance assessment mechanisms, scientifically guiding public environmental participation, and enhancing corporate awareness of environmental responsibility can we fundamentally solve the air pollution problem.
作者 马平平 张明 宋妍 孙瑞凤 Ma Pingping;Zhang Ming;Song Yan;Sun Ruifeng(School of Economics and Management,China University of Mining and Technology;School of Economics and Management,Xidian University)
出处 《环境经济研究》 2022年第4期124-141,共18页 Journal of Environmental Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金项目“自媒体视域下公众参与大气污染治理机理及保障机制研究”(72174195)和国家自然科学基金项目“碳中和背景下黄河流域资源型城市生态保护与高质量发展耦合协调推进机制研究”(72173094)的阶段性成果。
关键词 公众参与 空气污染 演化博弈 环保监督 Public Participation Air Pollution Evolutionary Game Environmental Protection Supervision
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