老旧小区更新协作困境的理论原型与破解机制——基于公共选择理论的分析框架

RESEARCH ON THEORETICAL PROTOTYPE AND SOLUTION OF THE COOPERATION DILEMMA IN OLD COMMUNITY REGENERATION:ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK BASED ON PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY

以我国城镇化发展模式转型为背景,围绕老旧小区集合产权的特征和更新理论研究欠缺的问题,从公共选择理论视角出发,分析了老旧小区更新中的集体选择困境,将问题概括为集体合作的困境(公地悲剧)和集体行动的困境(反公地悲剧)两种类型。按照公共选择理论的分析框架,借助“风险-收益、成本-效用、投票-博弈”三种模型,分析得出了集体选择困境的破解路径,包括解决集体合作困境的“为不合作付费”和“设置共有产权代理人”,解决集体行动困境的“外部因素调节”和“改变投票激励”。最后,提出了老旧小区更新的“集体精明选择”思路,并阐述其组织机制、运作支撑模式和适用范畴。

With the transformation of China’s urbanization development model as the background,and focusing on the characteristics of the collective property rights of old communities and the lack of theoretical research on regeneration,this paper analyzes the dilemma of collective choice in the regeneration of old communities from the perspective of public choice theory,and summarizes the problems into two types:the dilemma of collective cooperation(the tragedy of the commons)and the dilemma of collective action(the tragedy of the anti-commons).According to the analysis framework of public choice theory,with the help of three models of“risk-return,cost-utility,and votinggame”,this paper analyzes and obtains the solutions to the dilemma of collective choice,including“paying for non-cooperation”and“setting up common property right agents”to solve the dilemma of collective cooperation,as well as“external factor regulation”and“changing voting incentives”to solve the dilemma of collective action.Finally,it puts forward the idea of“collective smart choice”for the regeneration of old residential areas,and expounds its organizational mechanism,operation support mode,and application scope.