政府激励下供应链碳减排技术创新微分博弈

Differential Game of Carbon Emission Reduction Technology Innovation in Supply Chain under Government Incentives

为了提高企业碳减排创新积极性,分析了基于政府激励下制造商和供应商组成的两级供应链的博弈策略。将碳减排技术存量作为状态变量,构建无政府激励模式、政府激励供应商模式与政府激励制造商模式的动态优化模型;利用微分博弈的方法对模型进行求解,并对相关参数进行敏感性分析。研究结果表明,政府激励系数影响企业是否愿意进行碳减排技术创新以及供应链成员的利润,有政府激励的最优状态轨迹高于无政府激励的最优状态轨迹;企业利润随着消费者敏感系数的增加呈现先升高后降低的趋势。

In order to improve the enterprises′enthusiasm for the innovation of carbon emission reduction,a two-level supply chain game strategy was established.The basis of this game is government incentives.Taking the carbon emission reduction technology stock as the state variable,the dynamic optimization model was constructed with the non-government incentive mode,the government incentive for supplier mode and the government incentive for manufacturer mode.The model was solved by the method of differential game and the sensitivity analysis of related parameters is carried out.The research shows that the government incentive coefficient will affect whether companies are willing to innovate carbon emission reduction technologies and will influence the profits of supply chain members.The optimal state trajectory under government incentives is higher than that without government incentives.With the increase of consumer sensitivity coefficient,corporate profits tend to increase first and then decrease.