创始人管理、控制权与企业风险承担

Founder Management,Controlright and Corporate Risk Taking

民营企业创始人管理对企业风险承担有决定性影响。以2007—2020年595家民营上市公司作为研究样本,实证考察创始人管理与企业风险承担水平之间的关系以及创始人控制权的调节作用。研究发现,创始人管理有助于提升风险承担水平,但随着创始人控制权的增加,风险承担水平显著下降。进一步研究表明,公司内部资本市场规模扩大、产品市场竞争水平提升和宏观环境不确定性增加均会显著抑制创始人管理的风险承担水平。机制研究发现,两权偏离度、盈余管理和创新水平在创始人管理提升公司风险承担中起到显著的中介效应。

Based on the fact that Founder management of private enterprises has a decisive influence on enterprise risk-taking,but few related researches are involved,this paper empirically studies the relationship between founder management and enterprise risk-taking level,and the moderating effect of Founder control by taking 595 private listed companies from 2007 to 2020 as research samples.The results show that Founder management helps to improve the level of risk-taking,but with the increase of Founder control,the level of risk-taking decreases significantly,and the above conclusion is still valid after the robustness test of double difference and instrumental variable method.Further research shows that the expansion of internal capital market scale,the improvement of product market competition level and the increase of macro environment uncertainty will significantly inhibit the risk-taking level of founder management.The mechanism study finds that the degree of two rights deviation,earnings management and innovation level play a significant mediating role in founder management to enhance corporate risk-taking.