考虑低碳宣传水平的供应链成本共担契约研究

Study on Supply Chain Cost Sharing Contract Considering Low Carbon Propaganda Level

本文分析了一个二级供应链中零售商的低碳宣传问题,构建了一个制造商对零售商低碳宣传费用进行补贴的成本共担契约模型,通过引入拉格朗日函数K-T条件,得到最大低碳宣传水平和非最大宣传水平下的最优解和契约达成的有效区间,并分析了各影响因素对两种情况下最优解及有效区间的影响。研究发现,成本共担契约能否达成取决于消费者低碳宣传敏感度和零售商的边际利润,零售商的边际利润较大时,可实现最大低碳宣传水平下的成本共担契约,零售商的边际利润较小时,可实现非最大低碳宣传水平下的成本共担契约;零售商最大低碳宣传水平下有效区间范围与低碳宣传成本系数以及最大低碳宣传水平负相关,与消费者低碳宣传敏感度以及制造商低碳产品边际利润正相关,零售商非最大宣传水平下则相反。最后通过MATLAB仿真模拟验证了模型的正确性和有效性。

The retailer’s low-carbon propaganda problem in a two-stage supply chain is analyzed, and a cost-sharing contract model for manufacturer to subsidize retailer’s low-carbon propaganda cost is established.By introducing the Lagrange function K-T condition, the optimal solution and the effective interval of the contract are obtained under the maximum low-carbon propaganda level and the non-maximum propaganda level, and the influence of various factors on the optimal solution and the effective interval are analyzed.It is found that whether the cost-sharing contract can be reached depends on the sensitivity of consumers to low-carbon propaganda and the marginal profit of retailers.When the marginal profit of retailer is large, the cost-sharing contract under the maximum low-carbon propaganda level can be realized, and when the marginal profit of retailer is small, the cost-sharing contract under non-maximum low-carbon propaganda level can be realized.The effective range under the maximum low-carbon propaganda level is negatively correlated with the cost coefficient of low-carbon propaganda and the maximum low-carbon propaganda le-vel, and is positively correlated with the consumers’ sensitivity of low-carbon propaganda and the marginal profit of manufacturers.The effective range under non-maximum low-carbon propaganda level is reverse.Finally, the correctness and effectiveness of the model are verified by MATLAB simulation.