非国有股东治理与资本市场估值偏误——基于国有企业混合所有制改革的经验证据

Non-State Shareholder Governance and Capital Market Valuation Bias——Empirical Evidence Based on Mixed Ownership Reform of State-Owned Enterprises

在全面深化改革与高质量发展的新时代背景下,如何有效地缓解资本市场估值偏误、促进资本市场健康发展,这一话题在顶层设计、学术研究以及实务领域都备受瞩目。本文以2008—2019年国有上市公司为研究对象,从股权结构以及董事制衡两个维度实证检验混合所有制改革中非国有股东治理对股票估值偏误的影响。研究发现:基于股权结构层面的治理无法有效改善资本市场估值偏误,但董事制衡的治理效应能够通过改善公司治理效率与信息透明度等路径来抑制国有企业股价偏误现象。进一步研究表明,只有在地方上市国有企业中委派非国有董事,才能有效改善股票估值偏误现象,并且该治理效应在国有企业管理层权力较弱时更为有效。经非国有股东改善估值偏误后,国有企业金融错配水平得以缓解,股价崩盘风险显著下降。

In the context of the new era of comprehensive deepening reform and high-quality development,the topic of how to effectively mitigate capital market valuation bias and promote healthy development of the capital market has attracted much attention in the top-level design,academic research as well as practical fields. This paper empirically examines the impact of non-state shareholder governance on stock valuation bias in mixed ownership reforms along two dimensions: shareholding structure as well as director checks and balances by using state-owned listed companies from 2008 to 2019. It is found that governance based on the equity structure dimension cannot effectively improve capital market valuation bias,but the governance effect of director checks and balances can suppress SOE stock price bias through the path of improving corporate governance level and information transparency. Further research shows that only the appointment of non-state directors in local listed SOEs can effectively improve the stock valuation bias;and this governance effect is more effective when the management of SOEs is less powerful. The level of financial mismatch of SOEs is mitigated and the risk of stock price collapse is significantly reduced after the improvement of stock valuation by non-state shareholders.