摘要
本文以2007-2020年沪深A股上市公司为样本,探讨了分析师行业专长对企业研发投入的影响。研究发现,分析师行业专长能够促进企业研发投入。中介效应检验表明,缓解融资约束和监督治理在分析师行业专长促进企业研发投入中发挥了部分中介效应。文章进一步对产权性质、行业属性以及企业信息透明度的异质性进行分析发现,在非国有企业、高技术企业以及信息透明度较低的企业中,分析师行业专长对企业研发投入的促进作用更大。本文丰富了分析师行业专长经济后果以及企业研发投入影响因素的相关研究,同时对于提升分析师在资本市场上的信息中介作用,以及推动企业创新具有重要的实践意义。
This paper takes Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020 as samples to explore the impact of analysts’industry expertise on enterprise R&D investment.It is found that analysts’industry expertise can promote enterprise R&D investment.The intermediary effect test shows that the easing of financing constraints and supervision governance play a partial intermediary effect on the promotion of R&D investment by analysts’industry expertise.Furthermore,based on the heterogeneity analysis of property rights,industry attributes and enterprise information transparency,it is found that in non-state-owned enterprises,high-tech enterprises and enterprises with low information transparency,analysts’industry expertise has a greater impact on R&D investment.This paper enriched the relevant research on the economic consequences of analyst industry expertise and the factors influencing enterprise R&D investment,and also had important practical significance for improving the information intermediary role of analysts in the capital market and promoting enterprise innovation.
作者
王鑫斌
郭菲
彭效冉
WANG Xin-bin;GUO Fei;PENG Xiao-ran(School of Management,Tianjin Normal University,Tianjin 300387)
出处
《财务与金融》
2022年第6期32-38,共7页
Accounting and Finance
基金
天津市哲学社会科学规划项目“分析师跟踪对企业研发投资影响研究”(项目编号:TJGL18-040)。
关键词
分析师行业专长
研发投入
融资约束
监督治理
Analysts’Industry Expertise
R&D Investment
Financing Constraints
Supervision and Governance