溢价并购与业绩承诺对内幕交易程度的影响——基于我国资本市场2010年至2020年实证数据的分析

The Influence of Premium M&A and Performance Commitment on the Degree of Insider Trading: An Analysis Based on the Empirical Data of China’s Capital Market from 2010 to 2020

我国资本市场中并购重组活跃,溢价并购衍生的内幕交易问题亟须关注。以我国上市公司2010年至2020年实施的重大资产重组事件为样本,实证研究发现:第一,并购溢价率越高,预期股价涨幅越大,内幕交易潜在收益上升,内幕交易可能越严重;第二,签订业绩承诺的溢价并购,相对于没有签订业绩承诺的样本,衍生的内幕交易更严重,高业绩承诺是表明被并购公司具有较强盈利能力的信号,可能会直接推高并购溢价率并刺激股价上涨,进而引发的内幕交易就更严重;第三,异质性分析显示,采用股份支付方式和采用收益法估值的并购重组较其他样本衍生的内幕交易更严重。因此,合理降低重组过程中的并购溢价率,严格规范业绩承诺和收益法估值过程,防范溢价并购信息成为刺激股价获取内幕交易高额收益的手段,可能是有效遏制内幕交易的方法。

M&A in China’s capital market is very active, and the problem of insider trading derived from M&A deserve attention. Taking the major asset restructuring events implemented by China’s listed companies from 2010 to 2020 as a sample, the research draws the following conclusions: first,the higher the M&A premium rate, the greater expected increase in stock price and potential income of trading, and the more serious insider trading. Second, compared with the sample without performance commitment, the insider trading derived from M&A with performance commitment is more serious. High performance commitment is a signal that the acquired company has strong profitability, which directly pushes up the M&A premium rate and stimulates the rise of stock price,and the more serious insider trading will be triggered. Third, Heterogeneity analysis shows that the payment method of M&A affects the degree of insider trading, and the insider trading derived from M&A with share based payment is more serious. The valuation method of M&A also affects the degree of insider trading, and the insider trading derived from M&A valued by income method is more serious. Therefore, reasonably reducing the M&A premium rate in the reorganization process,strictly standardizing the performance commitment and income method valuation process in the reorganization, and preventing M&A information as a means to stimulate stock prices are methods to curb insider trading.