中国地方政府环境规制竞争行为研究

Research on the Competitive Behavior of Environmental Regulation of Local Governments in China

针对“增长型政府”经济发展模式可能带来的负面影响,通过构建两阶段动态博弈模型研究地方政府环境规制竞争行为的决定机制,并选择2003—2020年中国285个地级及以上城市数据作为样本进行实证分析,结果表明:在全国层面以及中西部地区,环境规制与经济增长的关系为倒U型,但在东部地区,环境规制促进经济增长且不存在非线性关系;全国和各地区的地方政府环境规制竞争总体上呈现“逐顶竞争”形态,但对于2020年来说,中部地区的地方政府环境规制竞争形态可能会从“逐顶竞争”转为“差异化竞争”甚至是“逐底竞争”。为了防止地方政府机会主义行为的出现,应进一步完善环境管理体制、实施差异化的环境规制政策和引导环境规制促进绿色技术创新。

In view of the possible negative impact of the“growth oriented government”economic development model,this paper studies the decision-making mechanism of local governments’environmental regulation competition behavior by building a two-stage dynamic game model,and selects 285 cities at prefecture level and above in China from 2003 to 2020 as samples for empirical analysis.The results show that the relationship between environmental regulation and economic growth is inverted U at the national level and in the central and western regions,but in the eastern regions,environmental regulation promotes economic growth without nonlinear relationship.The competition of local government environmental regulation across the country and regions presents the form of“race-to-top competition”,but for 2020,the competition of local government environmental regulation in the central region may change from“race-to-top competition”to“differentiated competition”or even“race-to-bottom competition”.In order to prevent the emergence of opportunistic behavior of local governments,it is necessary to improve environmental management system,implement differentiated environmental regulation policies and guide environmental regulation to promote green technology innovation.