为何“减税难降负”?——基于目标激励的财政锦标赛体系的解释

Why Tax Cuts Cannot Reduce the Corporate Burden:An Explanation Based on Target Incentive Fiscal Championship System

财政锦标赛作为政治锦标赛的主要内容之一,是研究“减税难降负”现象的重要视角。与既有文献从税收征管、财政压力、官员激励等视角展开分析不同,本文基于目标激励的财政锦标赛体系,利用2013—2019年中国省市两级政府工作报告中的数据及上市公司数据,实证检验地方财政收入目标对企业税负的影响效应及作用机制。研究发现:地方财政收入目标及其层层加码会对企业税负产生显著的正向影响,但其特征约束对企业税负的影响不显著。地方财政收入目标及其层层加码会通过提高税收征管力度的方式加剧企业税负,同时其对企业税负的影响存在显著的产权异质性和时间异质性。本文丰富了“减税难降负”的制度因素相关研究,为优化财政收入目标管理及降低企业税负、深化供给侧结构性改革提供了理论借鉴。

As one of the main contents of political tournaments, fiscal tournaments is an important perspective to study the phenomenon of “tax reduction is difficult to reduce the corporate burden”. Different from the analysis of existing literature from the perspectives of tax collection and management, fiscal pressure, official incentives, etc., this paper empirically tests the impact and mechanism of local fiscal revenue targets on corporate tax burden by using the data in the 2013—2019 China provincial and municipal government work reports and the data of listed companies based on the target incentive fiscal Championship system. The research finds that the local fiscal revenue target and its top-down amplification will have a significant positive impact on the tax burden of enterprises, but its characteristic constraints have no significant impact on the tax burden of enterprises. The local fiscal revenue target and its top-down amplification can aggravate the tax burden of enterprises by improving the intensity of tax collection and management, and its impact on enterprise tax burden have shown significant property right heterogeneity and time heterogeneity. This paper enriches the relevant research on the institutional factors of "tax reduction is difficult to reduce the burden", and provides a theoretical reference for optimizing the target management of fiscal revenue, reducing the tax burden of enterprises, and deepening the supply side structural reform.