考虑成本信息不对称的闭环供应链网络均衡

Equilibrium of a closed-loop supply chain network considering costinformation asymmetry

为定性和定量分析成本信息不对称对闭环供应链网络均衡决策及利润的影响,利用非合作博弈理论建立了闭环供应链网络均衡模型,其中制造商隐瞒再制造成本信息且零售商隐瞒处理成本信息.结果表明,制造商或零售商低报其成本信息,在增加利润的同时会损害不隐瞒成本信息决策者的利润;反之,高报时结果相反.相比于制造商(零售商)单边成本信息不对称结果,制造商和零售商的双边成本信息不对称对隐瞒成本信息的决策者自身以及供应链整体更有利.选择合适的信息不对称战略对闭环供应链中各决策者及供应链整体都是有利的.

An equilibrium model of a closed-loop supply chain network was established according to the noncooperative game theory to qualitatively and quantitatively analyze the impact of asymmetric cost information on the equilibrium decisions and profits of the network,in which manufacturers conceal their remanufacturing cost information and retailers conceal their processing cost information.The results show that when manufacturers or retailers report lower than actual cost information,their profits increase at the expense of parties who do not hide cost information;otherwise,the results are the opposite in the over-reporting situation.Compared with the results of unilateral asymmetry cost information of either the manufacturer or the retailer,bilateral cost information asymmetry of both manufacturer and retailer is more beneficial to the decision maker who conceals the cost information and the whole supply chain.It is beneficial for decision makers and the whole supply chain to choose the right information asymmetry strategy.