非对称信息下政府补贴对双渠道订货决策的影响

Impact of government subsidies on ordering decisions in dual channelunder asymmetric information

针对政府补贴和非对称信息下零售商的策略性订货决策,建立由一个上游供应商和在位零售商、新进零售商组成的供应链模型,采用信号博弈模型对比分析无政府补贴和有政府补贴两种情形下的订货量决策.研究表明,政府补贴导致两个零售商的订货量混同均衡不复存在,并且分离均衡也在市场需求波动较大的情况下才会出现.其次,有意思的是,市场需求波动不大的低市场状态下,政府补贴低于某一阈值时两个零售商订货量均小于政府不补贴情形下的订货量.最后,政府补贴会改变上游供应商泄露在位零售商订货量信息的动机,当补贴较低时上游供应商不会泄露其订货信息.

Considering the retailer’s strategic ordering decision under government subsidies and asymmetric information,a supply chain model consisting of an upstream supplier,an incumbent retailer and an entrant retailer is established.The two retailers’order quantity decisions without and with government subsidies are analyzed by using the signaling game model.The results show that the pooling equilibrium of the signaling game no longer exists with government subsidy,and the separating equilibrium only appears when the market demand fluctuates greatly.Interestedly,in the low market with little fluctuation,the order quantity of two retailers with subsidy coefficient lower than a certain threshold is less than that without subsidy.Finally,government subsidy changes the motivation of the supplier to disclose the incumbent retailer’s order quantity so that the supplier will not disclose when the subsidy coefficient is relatively low.