摘要
探究两企业的竞争策略,其中一家企业通过丰富标准化产品种类吸引消费者,而另一家企业则通过提高定制水平和提供退货政策吸引消费者参与定制.基于消费者个人定制能力的异质性,构建两阶段双寡头博弈模型,通过逆向归纳法得到均衡解,对企业的最优策略进行比较,并给出用于比较企业利润的指标.结果表明,两企业在市场竞争中均能盈利,且定制产品的价格和利润不一定高于标准产品.消费者参与定制的个人努力成本增加会使消费者剩余降低,退货政策及消费者对产品多样化偏好增加则有助于消费者剩余的提升.
This paper studies the competitive strategies of two firms in which one attracts consumers by enriching the variety of standard products,while the other attracts consumers to customize the products by improving customization level and providing return policy.Based on the heterogeneity of consumers’customizing capability,this paper constructs a two-stage duopoly game model,and obtains the equilibrium solutions by backward induction.Comparisons of optimal strategies between two firms are made,and the index for comparing the profits of the two firms is also presented.Results show that the price of customized product is not necessarily higher than that of standard product,and the two firms are always profitable in market competition.Furthermore,Consumer surplus decreases in personal effort cost of customization,and increases in return policy and consumer preference for product variety.
作者
赵连霞
岳超楠
王芳晴
张小峰
温小琴
Zhao Lianxia;Yue Chaonan;Wang Fangqing;Zhang Xiaofeng;Wen Xiaoqin(School of Management,Shanghai University,Shanghai 200444,China)
出处
《系统工程学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2022年第6期827-839,共13页
Journal of Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71502100)
教育部人文社科规划基金资助项目(20YJAZH135)
上海市科委“科技创新行动计划”软科学项目(22692109100).
关键词
博弈模型
竞争策略
定制水平
标准多样化
退货政策
game model
competition strategy
customization level
standard diversification
return policy