摘要
近年来,随着大国竞争的回归,美国战略界开始重新关注有限核战争理论。有限核战争理论的建构逻辑、争论现状及其对美国目前核政策影响,已经成为讨论美国核战略的关键性问题。既有研究缺少对上述议题的系统性考察。文章认为,弥补常规力量劣势、强制核升级和限制损伤是有限核战争的三种主要机制。基于有限核战争的理论框架和政策经验,文章梳理了美国战略界近年来围绕有限核战争的必要性、可操作性以及核武器使用政策所展开的激烈辩论。在大国竞争的背景下,美国战略界的辩论增强了有限核战争在美国核政策中的地位。然而,由于受到内在缺陷和技术因素的限制,有限核战争理论的基本假设依然面临严重的现实困境,但是,有限核战争带来的风险仍值得重视。
In recent years,with the return of great power competition,the U.S. strategic community has begun to refocus on limited nuclear war theory.What is the logic of the limited nuclear war,how the debate on limited nuclear war is going,and what influences will this debate affect U.S.nuclear policy,these issues have become critical in the discussion of U.S.nuclear strategy.The article concludes three mechanisms for how “limited nuclear war” functions a deterrent and operational role:compensating for conventional force inferiority,coercive nuclear escalation,and damage limitation.Then,the article reviews the debate in the U.S.strategic community in recent years about the necessity and operability of limited nuclear war.In the era of great power competition,the debate in the U.S.strategic community has enhanced the status of limited nuclear war in U.S.nuclear policy.However,limited by inherent flaws and technical factors,the hypotheses of limited nuclear war theory face serious practical dilemmas.
作者
李享
高衡
Li Xiang;Gao Heng(Tsinghua University Department of International Relations;Peking University School of International Relations)
出处
《当代亚太》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第5期105-134,167,168,共32页
Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies
关键词
美国核战略
有限核战争
延伸威慑
核威慑
战略稳定
U.S.Nuclear Strategy
Limited Nuclear War
Extended Deterrence
Nuclear Deterrence
Strategic Stability