考虑奖惩机制的纺织品回收供应链博弈研究

Game research on textile recycling supply chain considering the reward and punishment mechanism

纺织品用户选用互联网回收平台对废旧纺织品进行回收,是当前可持续时尚的热点之一,如何有效激励和管理这类回收模式已成为重要议题。本文通过构建第三方网络回收平台、纺织品用户和政府监管部门之间的三方演化博弈模型,分析博弈主体策略选择的演化路径和最优的演化稳定策略,采用算例仿真分析,探讨了投入成本、努力程度、网络嵌入度、奖惩额度等因素对各主体策略选择概率的影响。结果表明,政府监管部门实施奖惩机制能有效促进第三方回收平台与纺织品用户积极参与回收,抑制两者的“搭便车”行为,且主要受其投入成本和声誉影响;自身参与成本越低,对方参与意愿、积极回收产生的额外收益及政府奖惩力度等因素越高,第三方回收平台与纺织品用户积极参与回收的概率越大。

With China’s growing emphasis on ecological civilization,waste textile recycling has become an important way to reduce the rate of resource consumption and promote sustainable fashion development,and is a necessary link to promote the realization of resource recycling in China.Since most textile users in China choose to discard or donate used textiles,the secondary utilization rate of used textiles is currently less than 20%.The main reason why textile users do not actively participate in recycling is that there are few recycling channels for waste textiles and the recycling process is complicated.The main reason why recyclers do not actively participate in recycling is that the operating cost is high and the adequate amount of recycling cannot be guaranteed to make the enterprise profitable.In recent years,the Internet has stimulated the development potential of many industries,and waste textile recycling has gradually stood on the“Internet+”windfall.The“Internet+waste textile recycling”model not only simplifies the recycling process,but makes the connection between recyclers and textile users closer,providing the possibility of increasing the amount of waste textile recycling.Therefore,whether the reward and punishment mechanism implemented by government regulators can motivate recyclers and textile users to actively participate in recycling and improve the recycling efficiency of waste textiles on the basis of the Internet recycling platform has become a hot issue in the industry and theoretical research.In order to improve the recycling efficiency of waste textiles and promote the healthy development of sustainable fashion,a tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed among government regulators,third-party online recycling platforms and textile users in the context of“Internet+recycling”.Firstly,the expected and average returns of the three game players under different strategy choices are calculated,and the replicated dynamic equations are collated,and the stability theorem further leads to the dynamic evolution diagram of the decision making of the government regulator,the third-party online recycling platform and the textile users.On this basis,the Jacobian matrix can be obtained by calculating the partial derivatives of three dynamic differential equations respectively,and all the evolutionary stable points of the game system can be obtained according to the Lyapunov system stability judgment method.Specifically,the strategy combination of active participation in recycling,active participation in recycling,and implementing reward and punishment mechanism is the optimal equilibrium state that can be achieved by the active participation of the supply chain players of“Internet+waste textile recycling”under the government reward and punishment mechanism.Finally,numerical simulation analysis is used to explore the influence of input cost,effort,network embeddedness,reward and punishment on the probability of strategy selection of each subject.At the same time,we analyze whether the implementation of incentives and penalties by government regulators can curb the“free-riding”behavior of third-party online recycling platforms and textile users,and increase the motivation of both to participate in recycling.The results show that the lower the cost of actively participating in recycling,the higher the willingness of the other party to participate,the additional benefits generated by actively participating in recycling,and the strength of government rewards and punishments,the higher the probability that the third-party recycling network platforms and textile users will choose the strategy of actively participating in recycling;the implementation of rewards and punishments by government regulators can effectively promote the active participation of the third-party recycling platforms and textile users in recycling and inhibit their“free-riding”behavior,and the investment cost and reputation impact of implementing rewards and punishments are the main factors determining the strategy choice of government regulators.Under the model of“Internet+waste textile recycling”,the optimal strategy choice of government regulators,third-party recycling platforms and textile users is studied,and the main factors affecting the decision of the three game subjects are analyzed,which can provide insights for the rapid development of sustainable fashion.On this basis,the specific incentives and penalties of government regulators and the optimal pricing and service strategies of the third-party recycling network platform will become the key issues for future research,which is expected to provide more detailed and feasible reference suggestions for the waste textile recycling industry.