摘要
谢弗在最近的研究中试图论证心灵哲学中经典的解释鸿沟与不同层次的实在之间跨层认知的不透明性是同一问题。他认为可以通过底定的形而上学律则来弥合所有的鸿沟。我们将反驳谢弗的论点并进一步辩护意识解释鸿沟问题的特殊性。最后我们认为,真正解开意识的解释鸿沟难题需要包含回答认识论和形而上学两类问题的解释性知识。
In recently work, Schaffer attempts to argue that the classic explanatory gap in philosophy of mind is the general problems as the epistemic opacity of across layers of reality at different levels. He believed that all the gaps could be bridged by the metaphysical grounding principles. We will refute Schaffer’s argument and further defend the specificity of the problem of consciousness explanatory gap. Finally, we argue that truly bridging the explanatory gap of consciousness requires explanatory knowledge that answers both epistemological and metaphysical questions.
作者
郁锋
YU Feng(Department of Philosophy,East China Normal University,Shanghai,200241)
出处
《自然辩证法通讯》
北大核心
2023年第1期10-16,共7页
Journal of Dialectics of Nature
基金
国家社科基金一般项目“多感官交互的知觉知识论研究”(项目编号:22BZX099)。
关键词
解释鸿沟
底定
分体学鸿沟
解释性知识
Explanatory gap
Grounding
Mereological gaps
Explanatory knowledge