摘要
本文将从三个层次入手来探讨解释鸿沟的基本预设及其困难。在第一层,本文将引入脑科学研究的最新进展来表明查尔默斯关于意识难易问题的区分缺乏事实依据。第二层将聚焦于形塑解释鸿沟的僵尸论证来考察其中包含的矛盾和不一致。对这一论证的分析有助于揭示在其预设中一种独特的意识理解。第三层试图呈现这一意识理解的基本结构中存在的问题,以及在现象意识这种独特的感知、意识理解中深藏的心物二元假设。本文最后将通过对感知的自然主义和生态性理解来探究非心物二元的一种新的意识理解可能。
This paper tries to explore the presumption and its problems in the explanatory gap in three layers.The first layer will introduce most recent progress in brain research, to show David Chalmers’ proposed division of the problems of consciousness that based on the proposed computational or neural mechanism in explanation of brain and consciousness is untenable. The second layer will focus on his Zombie argument, to clarify its incoherence and ambiguity in shaping the explanatory gap. This clarification would lead us to the special understanding of consciousness. The third layer tries to figure out the essential structure of this understanding,and dig out the underlying dualism in its misunderstanding of consciousness and perception. In the end, this paper attempts to give an alternative understanding of consciousness and a possible resolution for the explanatory gap.
作者
邓明艳
DENG Mingyan(School ofMarxism,Minzu University of China,Beijing,100081)
出处
《自然辩证法通讯》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第1期17-25,共9页
Journal of Dialectics of Nature
关键词
解释鸿沟
意识
功能
感知
Explanatory gap
Consciousness
Function
Perception