非国有股东治理与国有企业雇员激励——基于混合所有制改革的视角

Non-state shareholders’governance and employee incentive in SOEs:From the perspective of mixed ownership reform

雇员是企业创造财富和国家经济发展的核心力量,如何有效改善国有企业的雇员激励成为新时代全面深化国企改革的关键环节,本文研究混合所有制改革背景下非国有股东治理对国有企业雇员激励的影响作用.本文发现:非国有股东参与国企高层治理可以提升国企雇员的薪酬业绩敏感性,并且这种效果在外部制度环境较好、地方控制、股权制衡程度较高以及内部控制较好的国有企业中更为明显,而单纯的持有股权则无相应效果;进一步研究发现,非国有股东还可以改善国有企业的员工持股计划实施情况和雇员工作环境,最终提升国有企业的市场价值和生产效率.本文不仅对雇员激励和国有企业混合所有制改革的研究进行了有益补充,而且对决策高层在国家战略层面全面深化国企改革提供了参考价值.

Employees are the core power of enterprises to create wealth and national economic development.How to effectively improve employee incentives in SOEs has become a key to comprehensively deepening the reform in the new era.This paper studies the impact of non-state shareholders’governance on employee incentives in SOEs in the context of mixed ownership reform.It finds that the participation of non-state shareholders in high-level governance of SOEs can significantly improve the pay performance sensitivity of employees,and this effect is more obvious in SOEs with better external institutional environment,local control,high-level equity balance and better internal control;while simple equity balance has no corresponding effect.Further research shows that non-state shareholders can also promote SOEs to implement more employee stock ownership plans and improve employees’working environment,and ultimately improve the market value and production efficiency of SOEs.Therefore,this paper not only provides useful supplements to the relevant research on employee incentives and mixed ownership reform of SOEs,but also provides policy reference for national leader to comprehensively deepen the reform of SOEs at the national strategic level.