国有企业党组织治理与监管问询——来自内部治理问询函的经验证据

The Party Organization Governance in SOEs and Supervision Inquiry: Evidence from Internal Governance Inquiry Letters

国有企业要坚持中国共产党的领导,党组织治理已经成为国有企业的一种新型治理方式。文章以沪深两市2015-2019年发放的内部治理问询函为研究对象,研究了国企党组织治理对监管问询的影响及其机制。研究发现,国企党组织治理能有效降低收到内部治理问询函的概率和次数,这种作用主要是通过降低代理成本和提高企业信息透明度实现的。文章排除了国有企业俘获交易所官员和交易所弱化对国有企业监管问询这两种替代性解释。异质性分析发现,国企党组织治理可以减少股东会治理问题、董事会治理问题和经理层治理问题等类型的监管问询。进一步研究发现,国企党组织治理减少监管问询的作用在讨论前置实施后和高管晋升预期高的样本中更加显著,且收到内部治理问询函会导致公司累积超额收益率下降。文章的研究丰富了监管问询的相关研究,拓展了中国式监管问询的治理因素。同时,文章检验了国企党组织治理的积极作用,为规范国有企业经营行为提供了新的经验证据与启示。

As a unique supervision system in China’s capital market, supervision inquiry is one of the measures taken by the exchange to conduct non-punitive supervision of listed companies. Therefore, exploring the factors that affect the issuance of inquiry letters by exchanges has become an important proposition for academic research. Based on China’s unique institutional arrangement, this paper discusses the factors that affect listed SOEs’ inquiries from supervision from the perspective of the Party organization governance, which is a heterogeneous supervision method. Specifically, this paper takes the internal governance inquiry letters issued by Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2015 to 2019 as the research object, and discusses the influence mechanism of the Party organization governance on the receipt of internal governance inquiry letters by listed SOEs. Through the research methods of empirical analysis and text analysis, this paper mainly draws the following conclusions: First, the Party organization governance can effectively reduce the probability and frequency of listed SOEs receiving internal governance inquiry letters. This conclusion still exits under the premise of controlling for endogeneity. Second, the results of the mediation effect show that the Party organization governance is mainly achieved by reducing agency costs and increasing information transparency,thereby reducing the probability and frequency of listed SOEs receiving internal governance inquiry letters.Third, this paper uses Python to identify the heterogeneity and difference of internal governance inquiry letters, and finds that the Party organization governance can effectively reduce the types of inquiry letters such as shareholder meeting governance issues, board governance issues, and managerial governance issues. Fourth,the results based on the moderating effect show that the effectiveness of the Party organization governance in reducing internal governance inquiry letters is more significant in the samples of discussion of pre-implementation and high promotion expectation of executives. Fifth, the receipt of internal governance inquiry letters will lead to a decrease in the cumulative abnormal returns(CAR).The main contributions of this paper are as follows: First, it confirms that the Party organization governance can regulate the management behavior of SOEs, and provides useful evidence for the correct understanding of the Party organization embedded in the corporate governance structure. Second, it confirms that the Party organization governance is a supplement to the incomplete mechanism of market law, which can not only improve the transparency of company information, but also monitor hidden agency costs. Third, it not only verifies the effectiveness of pre-discussion system, but also verifies that attention should be paid to the use of executive promotion incentives.