“省直管县”改革对县域资源错配的影响及其作用机制——来自湖南省“省直管县”财政改革的检验

The Impact of the Reform of "Counties Directly Managed by the Province" on the Misallocation of County Resources: Taking the Financial Reform of "Counties Directly Managed by the Province" in Hunan Province as an Example

文章视“省直管县”财政改革为一项准自然实验,在搜集湖南省2006—2018年的县(市)级数据,测度湖南省86个县(市)的资本错配和劳动力错配程度的基础上,运用倾向性评分匹配方法及双重差分方法(PSM-DID)评估“省直管县”改革对县域资源错配影响。研究发现:受财政分权制度与晋升激励机制并存影响,“省直管县”改革会加剧县(市)级地区资本错配和劳动力错配程度,这一结果在进行系列稳健性检验下仍然成立。进一步利用中介效应模型检验发现,在诸多财政竞争手段中,“省直管县”改革主要通过财政支出竞争和引资竞争加剧县(市)级地区资源错配程度。基于此,文章就湖南省县(市)级官员实行多元化考核的晋升机制,进一步改进“省直管县”改革政策和约束财政支出方向等方面提出政策建议。

On the basis of county(city)-level data from 2006 to 2018 in Hunan Province, this paper measures the degree of capital mismatch and labor mismatch in 86 counties(cities) in Hunan Province, and uses the propensity score matching method and the difference-in-difference method(PSM-DID) to evaluate the impact of the reform of "counties directly managed by province" on the county resource mismatch. It’s found that the reform of "counties directly managed by province" will aggravate the degree of capital mismatch and labor mismatch in county(city)-level areas due to the coexistence of the financial decentralization system and the promotion incentive mechanism, which is still valid under a series of robustness tests. Then, it further uses the intermediary effect model to test and finds that, among many financial competition means, the reform of "counties directly managed by province" mainly intensifies the resource mismatch at county(city)-level through the financial expenditure competition and the capital attraction competition. Based on the above, it puts forward policy suggestions: the diversified assessment of promotion mechanism for county(city)-level officials in Hunan Province, the improvement of the reform policy of "counties directly managed by province" and the constraint of the financial expenditure.