中国式分权、社会资本与农村公共服务满意度

Chinese-style Decentralization,Social Capital and Rural Public Service Satisfaction

将财政分权体制与社会资本纳入农村公共服务供给的考察范畴,重点关注了中国式分权背景下不同维度社会资本对农村公共服务满意的调节效应。基于中国式分权的Stackelberg博弈模型证实了民生类支出偏好对村民具有较高的福利效应,社会资本不仅对提供者存在正向溢出渠道,还显著提升了村民福利。利用CGSS数据的实证结果表明:在考虑县级政府普遍面临财政困境的前提下,宽松的财政约束实际抑制了农村公共服务满意度提升,与正式制度存在替代关系的社会资本则显著提升了村民对公共服务的满意度。尽管如此,仍需警惕过度密集的网络嵌入所表现出的负向调节作用。以上结论通过分群回归和稳健性检验被证实是有效可信的,从而为纠正农村民生公共品供给偏向,补齐新时代农村公共服务短板提供了有益借鉴。

This paper takes fiscal decentralization and social capital into the scope of rural public service supply,focusing on the moderating effect of different dimensions of social capital on rural public service satisfaction under the background of Chinese-style decentralization.Stackelberg game model based on Chinese-style decentralization confirms people's livelihood expenditure preference has a high welfare effect on villagers.Social capital not only has a positive spillover channel for providers,but also significantly improves villagers'welfare.The empirical analysis using CGSS data shows that:considering the financial difficulties faced by county-level governments,loose financial constraints actually inhibit the improvement of rural public service satisfaction,while social capital,as the substitute of formal system,significantly promotes the villagers'satisfaction of public services.However,we still need to be aware of the negative moderating effect of over dense network embedding.The above conclusion is proved to be effective and credible by cluster estimation and robustness test,which provides a useful reference for correcting the bias of rural public goods supply and making up for the shortcomings of rural public service in the new era.