损失规避型零售商的股权融资决策:供应商VS第三方物流投资

Equity Financing Strategies for Retailer with Loss Aversion:Supplier Investment VS Third-party Logistics Investment

考虑由供应商、第三方物流企业(简称3PL)和损失规避型零售商组成的供应链系统,构建了供应商投资和3PL企业投资两种模式下的三方动态博弈模型,分析不同投资主体影响下供应链运营和零售商融资决策。研究发现:零售商的订购量随分红比例的增加而增加,损失规避系数越高,订购量对分红比例的变化越敏感;投资方的最优定价随分红比例的增加而降低;零售商与投资方的分红比例谈判空间与损失规避因子呈正向关系,且在一定阈值内才会实现零售商和投资方的帕累托改进;当3PL企业分红比例小于等于供应商分红比例时,零售商偏好第三方物流企业投资,并且两者存在更大的谈判空间,增加了供应链中参与主体共赢的机会。

Three-echelon supply chain system,consisting of a supplier,an enterprise of third-party logistics(3PL)and a retailer,was studied. The three-party dynamic game models were established to analyze the retailer′s decisions how to choose the supplier investment and 3PL investment,when the retailer was loss-averse. The results show that the retailer′s order quantity increases with dividend proportion,and such relation is deeply intensified with higher loss aversion coefficient. The investors,i.e.,the suppler or 3PL,adopt lower pricing strategy along with the rise of dividend proportion. The scope of dividend proportion is positively related to the loss aversion coefficient. Moreover,only the dividend proportion across a value threshold can help the retailer and investors realize their Pareto improvement. The retailer prefers 3PL investment when 3PL′s dividend proportion is less than or equal to suppliers′ investment. In this case,there is more room for negotiation and opportunity for supply chain′s three parties to improve the total performance.