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碳限额交易下考虑平台推广服务的竞争制造商减排决策研究 被引量:5

Competitive manufacturers emission reduction decision considering platform promotion service under the carbon cap-and-trade
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摘要 在碳限额交易机制下,研究了碳限额总量和平台推广服务对减排成本差异化的竞争制造商生产与减排决策的影响.首先,构建并求解了两家制造商同时购买平台推广服务、仅低减排成本制造商购买和仅高减排成本制造商购买三种情形下的优化模型.而后,从经济和环境角度分析三种情形下制造商的最优生产与减排决策.研究发现,虽然较低的碳限额总量可以使低减排成本制造商实现最大减排,但较低的总产量会限制制造商和平台发展;两类制造商将在仅有自身购买推广服务时生产最大产量,而在仅有竞争对手购买推广服务时生产最小产量;而当碳限额总量适中时,仅竞争对手购买推广服务会促使制造商提高减排比例.无论制造商做出何种推广购买决策,政府调整碳限额总量对相同类型制造商产量和减排比例的影响趋势是一致的.从经济利润角度看,制造商的推广购买决策受推广服务价格影响;而从环境角度来看,仅低减排成本制造商购买推广服务造成的环境污染最低;但对平台而言,无论是否考虑环境因素,两类制造商同时购买推广服务是最优情形. Under the carbon cap-and-trade system,this paper studies the impact of total carbon cap and platform promotion services on the production and emission reduction decisions of competitive manufacturers with differentiated emission-reduction costs.First,the optimization models are constructed and solved under three scenarios:Two manufacturers purchase the platform promotion service at the same time,only the manufacturer with low abatement costs purchases and only the manufacturer with high abatement costs purchases.Then,the optimal production and emission-reduction decision of manufacturers under the three scenarios are analyzed from the perspective of economy and environment.This paper finds that while the low emission reduction cost manufacturer can achieve maximum reduction when total carbon cap is low,lower total production can limit the manufacturer and the platform development;Both types of manufacturers will produce maximum output when only themselves purchase promotion services,and minimum output when only competitors purchase promotion services;When the total carbon cap is moderate,the purchase of promotional services by competitors only will induce manufacturers to increase their emissions reduction percentage.Regardless of the promotion purchase decisions made by manufacturers,the impact of government adjustments to total carbon cap has a consistent tendency to affect the same type of manufacturer’s output and emissions reduction percentage.From the economic profit perspective,manufacturers’promotion purchase strategies are influenced by the price for the promotion services,while from the environmental perspective,the lowest environmental pollution results when only low emission reduction cost manufacturer purchase promotion services.However,for the platform,it is optimal for both types of manufacturers to purchase promotion services all,regardless of whether environmental considerations are taken into account.
作者 杨建华 解雯倩 YANG Jianhua;XIE Wenqian(School of Economics and Management,University of Science and Technology Beijing,Beijing 100083,China;Institute of Low Carbon Operations Strategy for Enterprises,Beijing 100083,China)
出处 《系统工程理论与实践》 EI CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2022年第12期3305-3318,共14页 Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金 北京市社科基金重点项目(19JDGLA001)。
关键词 碳限额与交易机制 竞争制造商 平台推广 环境影响 cap-and-trade schemes competitive manufacturers platform promotion environmental impact
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