地方人大预算监督的主体特征与治理绩效研究

Research on the Subject Characteristics and Governance Performance of Budget Supervision of Local People’s Congress

提升地方人大预算监督绩效是实现国家治理体系和治理能力现代化的重要体现。笔者基于中国地级市人大常委会主任是否由市委书记兼任这一重要制度事实,采用2010—2018年272个地级市的数据和系统GMM方法,深入研究了兼任制度对人大预算监督绩效的影响。研究表明,相比人大常委会主任的专任,兼任制度强化了人大预算监督效力。在发展压力与官员晋升压力小、财政自主度强与公众受教育水平高的地区以及新《预算法》实施后尤其明显。进一步对地方预算收支结构和预算外债务的拓展研究表明,兼任制度对优化财政收支结构和防范地方债务风险发挥了积极作用,但对非标债务的监督趋于弱化。经过一系列稳健性检检后,本文的实证结论不变。本文的研究为新时期提升人大预算监督实效和推动发展型政府向服务型政府转型提供重要参考。

Improving the performance of local people’s congresses’budget oversight is an important manifestation of modernizing the country’s governance system and capacity.We study how the concurrent leadership system(CLS)affects the effectiveness of municipal budget management in China.Using municipal data from 2010 to 2018 and system GMM,this analysis uncovers that the CLS has a significant improvement on the budget-management efficiency,especially among regions with low development pressure and officials’promotion pressure,higher financial autonomy or better education resources,and after the implementation of the new Budget Law.The CLS also has played a positive role in optimizing the structure of fiscal revenue and expenditure and reduces the local debt risk through balancing budget,but may increase the risk of non-standard debt.After a series of robustness checks,the empirical conclusions of this paper remain unchanged.This study provides an important reference for improving the effectiveness of NPC budget supervision and promoting the transformation from a developmental government to a service-oriented government in the new period.