查尔默斯的埃利亚论证和虚拟主义

Chalmers’s Eleatic Argument and Virtualism

大卫·查尔默斯在《Reality+》中论证了关于虚拟现实的实在论。根据此观点,虚拟现实,包括其中的对象、性质以及事件都是真实的。在他辩护虚拟现实实在论中,埃利亚论证扮演了尤其重要的角色。他通过说明虚拟对象和数字对象共享因果效力,以此论证两者是同一的,也因此证明了虚拟对象跟数字对象一样,也是真实的。然而,埃利亚论证存在强弱版本两种解读,弱版本无法证明虚拟对象和数字对象同一,而强版本会导致乞题。另外,具有因果效力并不是虚拟对象是真实的这一论断的充分条件。拒斥实在论后,虚拟主义成为可行选项。根据虚拟主义,虚拟现实中的大部分对象、性质以及事件既不是纯虚构的,也不是纯真实的。它们的实在性取决于对现实的表征程度。

David Chalmers, in his recently book ‘Reality+’, argues for the realism about virtual reality: virtual reality, including its objects, properties and events, is real. Among the several arguments he proposes, Eleatic argument is the most important one, according to which virtual objects and digital objects share causal effects;this implies that they are identical, and thereby virtual objects are as real as digital ones. However, there are two readings of Eleatic argument: the weak one does not convey the conclusion that virtual objects are digital objects, and the strong one begs the question against its opponents. Moreover, having causal effects is insufficient for a virtual object to be real. Nevertheless, defending fictionalism about virtual objects is not the option. Instead, a middle way is taken, virtualism is proposed and defended. Roughly, virtualism believes that most objects, properties and events in virtual reality are neither purely fictional nor purely real. Their reality is different in degree, depending on the degree of representation of reality;there is also a kind of virtual facts or entities, namely institutional entities, which can be completely real.