纪委治理嵌入与企业金融化:来自国有企业的证据

Governance Involvement of Discipline Commission and Enterprise Financialization:Evidence from State-Owned Enterprises

在企业金融化成为我国投资领域的重要趋势后,党组织治理能否推动国有企业“脱虚返实”?文章以2010~2019年非金融国有上市公司为研究对象,通过双重差分模型检验了纪委治理对国企金融化的作用。研究发现,纪委参与国企治理有利于抑制国企金融化趋势,其通过抑制国企高管代理成本、提高董事会效率途径作用于企业金融化,纪委对企业金融化的抑制作用在地方国企和商业类国企中更强。文章不仅丰富了党组织治理的相关文献,而且为中国特殊的国企治理机制的作用发挥提供了经验证据。

After enterprise financialization has become an important trend in China’s investment field, can Party organization governance help state-owned enterprises to shift from the virtual to the real economy? Researching the non-financial state-owned listed companies from 2010 to 2019, this paper tests the role of the governance of commissions for discipline inspection in the financialization of state-owned enterprises through the difference-in-difference model. The study finds that the participation of the commissions for discipline inspection in the governance of the board of state-owned enterprises is conducive to curb the trend of financialization of state-owned enterprises. The mechanism test results are that the governance of the commissions for discipline inspection acts on the financialization of enterprises by inhibiting the agency cost of senior executives of state-owned enterprises and improving the efficiency of the board of directors. Further, the study finds that the inhibitory effect of the commissions for discipline inspection on enterprise financialization is stronger in local state-owned enterprises and commercial state-owned enterprises.