摘要
针对直播电商食品安全问题,建立直播电商背景下品牌商与主播关于食品安全相关行为的微分博弈模型,利用博弈论与最优控制理论在集中决策、分散决策、成本分担模式下分别求解品牌商与主播的均衡策略并进行比较分析。其主要结果表明:在品牌商获得总收益的分配比例大于三分之一的条件下,集中决策模式下主播选品投入最大、成本分担模式次之、分散决策模式最低,集中决策下的品牌商品控投入与宣传投入都是最大的,集中决策下的食品质量与品牌商商誉最高,并且博弈双方总利润是最大的。据此,提出政府监管部门需尽快建立健全直播电商的食品销售制度体系、建立品牌商的信用档案等,电商平台要进一步完善主播的考评奖惩制度等建议。
Aiming at the food safety issues of live e-commerce,establish a differential game model of food safety-related behaviors between brand owners and anchors in the context of live e-commerce,using game theory and optimal control theory to solve the equilibrium strategies of brand merchants and anchors under centralized decision-making,decentralized decision-making,and cost-sharing modes,and compare and analyze them.The main conclusion shows that when the distribution ratio of the total income obtained by the brand owner is greater than one-third,the strict degree of anchor selection under the mode of centralized decision-making is the most stringent,mode of cost sharing decision-making is the second,mode of decentralized decision-making is the least,brand owners under mode of centralized decision-making have the largest investment in food quality control and publicity,the food quality and the brand goodwill under the centralized decision-making are the highest,and the total profit of both parties in the game is the largest.Based on this,it is proposed that government regulatory authorities should establish and improve the food sales system of live e-commerce as soon as possible,establish credit files for brand owners,etc.,and e-commerce platforms should further improve the evaluation,reward and punishment system for anchors and other suggestions.
作者
费威
王阔
Fei Wei;Wang Kuo(School of Economics,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics)
出处
《宏观质量研究》
2023年第1期87-98,共12页
Journal of Macro-quality Research
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目(22AGL033)
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(21YJA790015)
辽宁省经济社会发展研究课题(2023lslybkt-048)
东北财经大学提升社会服务能力建设项目(SF-Z202205)的成果。
关键词
直播电商
食品安全
品牌商
主播
微分博弈
live e-commerce
food safety
brand owner
anchor
differential game