通往《逻辑哲学论》之路——从事实和形式经由描画回到模态

A Path to the Tractatus——From Facts and Forms through Picturing to Modality

《逻辑哲学论》不是一天完成的,以特定视角追溯该书思想形成过程可以获得新发现。从分析弗雷格与罗素命题观的“去模态化”理念入手,探讨了维特根斯坦对罗素多重关系判断理论的批判,继而通过文本解读的方式有针对性地考察了维特根斯坦《逻辑笔记》、战时笔记以及由它们铺垫而成的《逻辑哲学论》的相关论题,考察了其中提出的命题的含义、否定、事实、形式、含义-规定、图像、模型、结构等概念之间的逻辑关系,特别通过把握“事态”概念的来龙去脉明确揭示出,正是通过将模态纳入图像对实际的描画,《逻辑哲学论》才解决了假命题的意义问题,由此可以明确,图像和命题的根本性质是成为现实的组成部分的可能性,从而断定命题及其真和假在本质上就包含初始的模态概念,应该让模态重新回到逻辑当中来。

The Tractatus was not completed in one day,and some new discoveries can be obtained by tracing the ideological formation process of the book from a specific perspective. Starting from the analysis of the“de-modalization”of Frege and Russell’s views of propositions,this paper discusses Wittgenstein’s criticism of Russell’s multiple relationship theory of judgments,and then,through text interpretation,makes a targeted study of Wittgenstein’s“Notes of Logic”,“wartime notebooks”and the related topics of the Tractatus,which are foreshadowed by them,and examines the The logical relationship between concepts such as sense of propositions,negation,fact,form,sense-stipulation,picture,model,structure,and so on;especially by grasping the context of the concept of“state-of-things”,it can be clearly revealed that it is through the inclusion of modality into the description of reality by pictures that the Tractatus solves the problem of the meaning of false propositions. From this, it can be clear that the fundamental nature of pictures and propositions is the possibility of becoming an integral part of reality,and thus it can be concluded that propositions and their truth and falsehood essentially contain the initial concept of modality,which should be returned to logic.