考虑声誉激励机制的金融科技创新监管演化博弈仿真分析

Evolution Game Simulation Analysis of FinTech Innovation Regulation with Consideration of Reputation Incentive Mechanism

为了探究声誉激励机制对金融科技创新监管的影响,基于演化博弈论,构建了考虑与未考虑声誉激励机制两种情况下的金融科技创新监管演化博弈模型。通过分析两种模型的局部稳定性,探讨了金融科技公司创新行为与监管部门监管策略间博弈的演化路径。研究结果表明,声誉激励机制有效地促进了金融科技创新的自律性,当声誉激励高于一定的水平时,金融科技公司将自觉开展合规创新,达到“无为而治”的效果。声誉的激励效果受违规创新的惩罚值和违规创新所得额外收益的影响较大,通过合理设置违规创新的惩罚值,违规创新的额外收益以及声誉激励系数实现最佳的声誉激励效果。

This paper aims to explore the influence of reputation incentive mechanism on fintech innovational regulation.The evolutionary game model of fintech innovation regulation considering reputation incentive mechanism or not based on evolutionary game theory are constructed.The evolution path of the game between the innovation behavior of fintech companies and the regulatory strategy of the regulatory authorities in the two situations is analyzed according to the evolutionary stability strategy.The results show that the reputation incentive mechanism effectively promotes the self-discipline of fintech innovation.When reputation incentives are higher,fintech companies will consciously carry out compliance innovation to achieve the effect of“doing nothing”.The incentive effect of reputation is greatly affected by the penalty value of illegal innovation and the additional income from illegal innovation.The best reputation incentive effect can be achieved by reasonably setting the penalty value of illegal innovation,the extra benefits of illegal innovation and the reputation incentive coefficient.