摘要
近年来,我国地方非税收入呈现出高速增长势头,并带来了一些负面影响。为此,本文通过研究2009—2020年278个地级市地方收入目标考核、官员晋升与非税收入增长的关系,为地方非税收入高速增长的现象提供了一个新解释,即在晋升激励下,地方政府倾向于制定较高地方收入目标、严格推进目标实现并力争超额完成目标,这一行为在目标硬约束和层层加码条件下,会进一步助推地方非税收入的高速增长。研究结论揭示了当前我国地方非税收入治理应站在系统治理的高度,重点改革地方政府政绩考核制度,加强非税收入征管监督,建立非税收入与转移支付更加紧密的联系,降低地方对收入增长的“速度情结”。
In recent years,China’s local non-tax revenue has shown a rapid growth momentum,which has brought some negative effects.Therefore,we provide a new explanation for the extraordinary growth of local non-tax revenue by studying the relationship between the revenue target assessment,promotion of officials and the growth of non-tax revenue in 278 prefecture level cities from 2009 to 2020.Under the incentive of Promotion Tournament,to achieve personal promotion,local government officials tend to set higher revenue targets,strictly promote and exceed the targets.This behavior will further enlarge and boost the extraordinary growth of local nontax revenue under the conditions of hard target constraints and increment.We also reveal that our local non-tax revenue governance should stand on the height of system governance,focus on reforming the local government performance appraisal system,strengthen the supervision of non-tax revenue collection and management,and establish a closer connection between non-tax revenue and transfer payment,and reduce the“Speed Obsession”of local officials.
作者
钟荣华
郭彦廷
洪源
陈丽
Zhong Ronghua;Guo Yanting;Hong Yuan;Chen Li
出处
《财政研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第10期116-128,共13页
Public Finance Research
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目“风险链视阈下的地方政府债务风险:多维评估、先导预警与常态治理研究”(71673077)。
关键词
非税收入增长
收入目标考核
官员晋升
Non-Tax Revenue Increase
Revenue Target Assessment
Officials’Promotion