企业盈余管理与政府补贴绩效:区分创新补贴与非创新补贴

Earnings management and government subsidy performance:a study based on the difference between innovation subsidy and non-innovation subsidy

利用2009—2017年中国沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,研究企业为获取政府补贴是否采取了不同的盈余管理方式及其相应的经济后果。研究发现:企业盈余管理迎合了政府补贴的差异化补贴标准,而且企业盈余管理弱化了政府补贴的补贴绩效。具体而言,正向应计盈余管理程度越高,企业获得的创新补贴越多,创新补贴对企业创新投入的促进作用越小;负向应计盈余管理或负向真实盈余管理程度越高,企业获得的非创新补贴越多,非创新补贴对企业价值的促进作用越小。进一步研究发现,高质量的外部审计与持股比例较高的机构投资者可以有效抑制企业通过正向应计盈余管理获取创新补贴与通过负向应计盈余管理获取非创新补贴的迎合行为,同时,持股比例较高的机构投资者对企业通过负向真实盈余管理获取非创新补贴的迎合行为亦存在一定的治理效果。研究不仅有助于在理论上厘清企业盈余管理与政府补贴的关系,而且对实践中政府创新补贴与非创新补贴的科学配置亦具有重要启示。

Using the A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2017 as samples,this paper explores whether enterprises adopt different earnings managementin order to get government subsidies and also studies their outcomes.The empirical results show that the answer to the first question is positive and the degree of earnings management weakens the performance of government subsidies.Specifically,enterprises with positive earnings management receive more innovation subsidies,and the greater the degree of positive earnings management,the less the promotion effect of innovation subsidies on enterprises’innovation input;enterprises with negative earnings management receive more non-innovation subsidies,and the greater the degree of negative earnings management,the less the promotion effect of non-innovation subsidies on enterprise value.It also finds that this strategy is discovered only in non-loss-making enterprises,enterprises with low quality of external audit,and enterprises with low proportion of institutional investors.This study not only helps to clarify the relationship between earnings management and government subsidies in theory,but also has important implications for the allocations of government innovation subsidies and non-innovation subsidies in practice.