摘要
实现经济绿色发展需要中央“提纲挈领”和地方政府“有为”相结合。2012年原环保部出台的《环境空气质量标准》是中央实施垂直监管、改变地方政府治理力度的重要政策。通过构建工业企业和企业污染匹配数据,使用倍差法研究发现,中央垂直监管显著改善了试点城市企业的环境绩效。平行趋势检验、安慰剂检验、溢出效应和反事实检验、更换因变量以及排除其他政策干扰等一系列检验支持了该发现的稳健性。进一步研究发现:(1)试点城市政府提高了对企业污染的处罚力度,企业通过末端治理的方式提高环境绩效;(2)政策在财政分权程度较高地区作用效果较强;(3)政策提升了污染行业的环境绩效,大规模企业、高风险承受能力企业与契约密集型行业率先实现清洁生产。基于宏观政策的微观影响这一研究视角,为构建央地协同环境治理体系和推动我国生态文明建设提供理论支撑。
Achieving sustainable economic development requires the combined efforts of the central and local governments. The “Ambient air quality standards” issued by the former Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection in 2012 is a key factor impacting the implementation of central environmental protection supervision and changes in local governance. This paper constructs matching data for Chinese Industrial Enterprise Database and firm level pollution data, and uses the difference in differences method to study the impact of the central policy on environmental-protection supervision on the environmental performance of enterprises. The results show that the policy has significantly improved the environmental performance of pilot enterprises. A series of tests, including parallel trend, placebo, spillover, and counterfactual tests, replacement of the dependent variable, and exclusion of other policy interventions support the robustness of this finding. Further, the study concludes:(1) Environmental-protection supervision increases the probability of local governments punishing pollution by enterprises, and enterprises improve their environmental performance through end-of-life treatment.(2) The policy has a strong effect in areas with a high degree of fiscal decentralization.(3) Environmental-protection supervision has improved the environmental performance of polluting industries. Large-scale enterprises, enterprises with a high risk tolerance, and contract-intensive industries have taken the lead in achieving cleaner production. From the perspective of the micro impact of macro policies, this paper provides theoretical support for the construction of environmental governance systems involving central-local collaboration and promoting the construction of ecological civilization in China.
作者
王贤彬
钟夏洋
WANG Xianbin;ZHONG Xiayang(School of Economics,Jinan University,Guangzhou 510632,China)
出处
《产业经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第6期29-42,共14页
Industrial Economics Research
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71773038)
国家自然科学基金面上项目(72273052)。
关键词
垂直监管
地方政府
环保处罚
环境绩效
契约密集型行业
vertical supervision
local government
environmental punishment
environmental performance
contract-intensive industries