上市公司内部监督机制的重构与优化--基于独立董事与监事会关系的分析

Reconstruction and Optimization of Internal Supervision Mechanism of Listed Companies: Based on the Analysis of the Relationship between the Independent Directors and the Board of Supervisors

当前,我国上市公司采用二元制的公司内部监督机制,独立董事和监事会共同行使监督权。但独立董事与监事会发轫于不同的文化传统与法律制度,二者不仅在价值取向上一致,而且在职权范围和人员选任标准上也高度类似,二元制公司内部监督机制在实践中引发了新一轮的治理危机。对此,在本轮公司法修订时,应继续坚持“强化自治、放松管制”的改革方向,革除二元制公司内部监督机制。审慎借鉴域外先进的制度经验,将选择权交给公司,从独立董事与监事会中择一作为上市公司的监督机构。在构建一元制公司内部监督机制的同时,应对现行制度的不完备性进行反思,同步改进现行独立董事和监事会制度,优化上市公司内部监督机制。

At present,China’s listed companies adopt dual coexistence supervision mechanism,in which the independent directors and the board of supervisors jointly exercise the supervision power.Although the independent directors and the board of supervisors originated from different cultural traditions and legal systems,they are consistent in value orientation and highly similar in terms of the scope of functions and the personnel selection standards.The dual coexistence supervision mechanism has triggered a new round of governance crisis in practice.Therefore,in this round of company law revision,we should continue to adhere to the reform direction of strengthening autonomy and relaxing regulation,and get rid of the dual coexistence supervision mechanism.In addition,it is necessary to prudently draw lessons from advanced overseas system experience,give the option to the company,and choose either the independent directors or the board of supervisors as the supervision organization of a listed company.While establishing the unitary supervision mechanism,we should also review the imperfection of the current system,improve the current system of independent directors and board of supervisors,and optimize the internal supervision mechanism of listed companies.