市场声誉惩罚失灵的中国方案及其价值——基于环保失信联合惩戒实践的证据

ON THE CHINESE SOLUTION OF MARKET REPUTATION PUNISHMENT FAILURE AND ITS EFFICACY——Evidence Based on the Practice of Environmental Dishonest Joint Punishment System in China

本文以资本市场所反映出的环境违法违规声誉惩罚为测度对象,理论分析并实证检验了我国具有创新性的失信联合惩戒制度缓解市场声誉惩罚失灵问题的逻辑和机制。实证证据表明:(1)在市场声誉惩罚失灵的环境领域,我国环境违法违规上市公司受到了显著的声誉惩罚,达到市值的-1.52%,占比总惩罚的98.06%。(2)环保失信联合惩戒制度是我国环境违法违规受到声誉惩罚的决定性因素,是我国资本市场所反映出的总惩罚效应的主要来源。(3)对比国内外相关研究,环保失信联合惩戒制度克服了我国以往对环境违法违规企业惩罚不当的问题,将环境违法违规成本提高至与主要发达国家可比的水平。

This paper theoretically analyzes the effect and mechanism of China’s innovative Dishonest Joint Punishment System on alleviating the failure of market reputation punishment and empirically measures the reputation punishment for environmental violations from the capital market.The empirical evidence suggests:(1)In the most inefficient field, environmental violations, China’s listed companies in violation of environmental laws and regulations have received significant reputation punishment.On average, reputation punishment represents 1.52% of the market capitalization, and accounts for 98.06% of the total punishment.(2)The Environmental Dishonest Joint Punishment System is the decisive factor of the reputation punishment of environmental violations in China.It is the main source of the total punishment measured from the capital market.(3)The comparative study shows the Environmental Dishonest Joint Punishment System overcomes the problems of improper incentives for enterprise’s environmental violations in China and increases the cost of environmental violations of enterprises in China to a level comparable to that of major developed countries.